Liberalism and the world circa 1930: Gilbert Murray’s The Ordeal of this Generation by Wilson, Peter
  
Peter Wilson
Liberalism and the world circa 1930: Gilbert 
Murray’s The Ordeal of this Generation 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
Original citation: 
Wilson, Peter (2009) Liberalism and the world circa 1930: Gilbert Murray’s The Ordeal of this 
Generation. Politik, 12 (4). pp. 15-20. 
 
© 2009 the author 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/30046/
 
Available in LSE Research Online: January 2011 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, 
incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process.  Some differences between 
this version and the published version may remain.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
Liberalism and the World circa 1930: Gilbert Murray’s The Ordeal of this 
Generation 
 
Peter Wilson, LSE 
 
(Accepted for publication November 2009 in Politik: Danish Journal of Political 
Science) 
 
In many ways this book captures the strengths of the liberal edifice that was 
hurriedly erected after the collapse of the old order in 1914-18. Yet within its 
elegant pages one also detects the cracks that were to grow ever larger and 
more disconcerting in the years that followed. It combines a robust defence of 
the League of Nations, a plea for more conscientious application of its 
Covenant, a cautious treatment of the role of democracy in promoting 
international order1, a sanguine interpretation of the nature and role of the 
British Empire, all united by a liberal/Aristotelian concern to promote ‘the good 
life for man’ defined in terms of increased freedom for the pursuit of virtue. Its 
author is the classicist and campaigner for peace, Gilbert Murray, an 
establishment liberal who did not see himself as such despite occupying the 
Regius Professorship of Greek at Oxford and being a member by marriage of 
one of the most prominent Whig aristocratic families of England. The book 
was based upon the Halley Stewart Lectures which Murray delivered in 1928. 
The Halley Steward Trust was a Christian educational foundation dedicated to 
                                                 
1 Contra Union of Democratic Control accounts. See Martin Ceadel, Semi-Detached Idealists: The 
British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), chs. 7 & 8; Peter Wilson, ‘Retrieving Cosmos: Gilbert Murray’s Thought on International 
Relations’, in C. Stray (ed.), Gilbert Murray Reassessed: Hellenism, Theatre, and International 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 244-5. 
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such ideals as ‘the discovery of the best means by which “the mind of Christ” 
may be applied to extending the Kingdom of God by the prevention and 
removal of human misery’ and the ‘fostering of good will between all races, 
tribes, peoples and nations so as to secure the fulfilment of the hope of 
“peace on earth”’.2 In the much more secular England of today it is easy to 
forget just how powerful and pervasive the Christian church and Christian 
ideals were in Britain before the Second World War. But also how relatively 
liberal it was—Murray was invited to give the lectures despite his rationalism 
and atheism being well-known. 
 
 The Preface to the volume gives the reader of today a strong clue to 
the character of Murray’s thinking. It begins: 
 
Profound changes, political, social, economic and intellectual, have 
taken place during the last fifty years in the environment of civilized 
man, and it is still doubtful whether or no he will succeed in 
understanding them and adapting himself to meet them. That is the 
‘ordeal’ which forms the subject of these lectures… 
 
The ‘still’ betrays the expectations of a liberal progressive who came of age 
when the Empire, British commercial strength, and faith in science and reason 
were at their height. England was the new Athens, and its Commonwealth a 
new Hellenic civilization—or so Murray and many fellow classically educated 
liberals liked to wax. The First World War revealed that this great rational, 
                                                 
2 Front matter, Gilbert Murray, The Ordeal of This Generation: The War, The League, and the Future 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1929). 
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scientific, and commercial civilization had a flaw—at least one big flaw—and 
‘progress as normal’ could not resume until it had been dealt with. But Murray 
and his fellow liberal intellectuals were confident that it would be dealt with, 
such was their faith in the power of reason to resolve even the most 
intractable problems. The fact that it had not been, fully, by 1928 provoked 
surprise; though not yet consternation—time there was still to cure the ills of 
the international body politic. 
 
 ‘Understanding and adapting’ to changed conditions reflects the 
Darwinian character of so much social and political thinking of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By this is meant not ‘social 
Darwinism’ in its sophisticated (Herbert Spencer), racist (Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain), or popular (‘survival of the fittest’) forms, but rather the 
understanding of life, including social life, in terms of evolution and adaptation. 
There was a tendency to assume objective conditions success in adaptation 
to which determined which species and groups would survive and prosper 
and which would struggle and sink. Understanding through careful 
observation, and the application of mind to experience, was the essential first 
step in the adaptive process. 
  
 Yet ‘the environment of civilized man’ contains further important clues. 
The nineteenth century habit of looking at the world in terms of the civilized 
and uncivilized, advanced peoples and backward peoples, pervades this and 
even subsequent Murray writings. Murray was no white supremacist. His 
outlook was cultural not socio-biological. Yet he believed that Western culture 
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was so far in advance of other cultures and so much in the van of humanity 
that the categories become in effect static, objective, and quasi-biological. By 
the same token, according to the standards of his day he was no sexist. He 
was an ardent suffragist, his commitment to the goal of universal adult 
suffrage being one of the qualities (along with his teetotalism) that attracted 
his future wife Lady Mary Howard, and her influential mother, the Countess of 
Carlisle, to him.3 Yet the social environment which he had in mind was 
undoubtedly that not of ‘Man’ but of ‘men’—perhaps with the occasional 
brilliant, or odd, or brilliantly odd and exceptional woman (such as the 
classicist Jane Harrison, novelist Virginia Woolf, or his League International 
Committee for Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) colleague Madame Curie). 
Murray’s highbrow, elitist, Oxbridge Senior Common Room view of the world 
was very much that of the privileged, upper-middle-class, expensively 
educated male that Woolf wrote so penetratingly about in Three Guineas.4 It 
was a male view all the more unshakeable and irritating for its steadfast 
commitment to liberal causes, its well-intentioned paternalism, and the sense 
of public duty (and sometimes moral superiority) that accompanied it. 
 
 The subtitle should also not pass brief comment. It expresses, in a 
beguilingly simple way, an article of faith of the inter-war liberal creed. War 
was the problem, the League the solution, and the future consisted of refining 
the latter to more effectively deal with the former—in order to get history back 
                                                 
3 See Francis West, Gilbert Murray: A Life (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1984), 25-58; Duncan Wilson, 
Gilbert Murray OM, 1866-1957 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 25-40. 
4 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, and Three Guineas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 
[1929 & 1938]). 
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onto its normal, progressive, course.5 ‘The League’, Murray declared, ‘is the 
great institution invented by modern man for preserving and improving the 
social order without either war or revolution’.6
 
 Yet it would be wrong to think that Murray assumed that this 
progressive course was trouble-free. As might be expected from the foremost 
interpreter of the Greek world to his generation, Murray was alive to the tragic 
element of life, and it is worth dwelling on this for a few moments. The whole 
animal kingdom, Murray asserted, killed in order to live. Human beings lived 
by eating other animals or else by eating their food. Constant fighting and 
killing was a fundamental fact of life and no moral problem could be properly 
addressed without recognition of it.  Life was not based on peace but ‘on an 
unrelenting murderous struggle’.7 There was, furthermore, a glamour 
attaching to combat and war that no pacifically minded person should ignore. 
War brought forth horror but also excitement. Acts of physical courage and 
heroism won admiration regardless of the virtue of their underlying motivation 
or the effects they caused. The desire to test oneself in the face of danger 
was a deep human instinct. Doing so for others brought adoration in life and in 
death immortal memory.8 There was nobility in the ideal ‘dulce et decorum est 
pro patria mori’. 
 
                                                 
5 The thrust, of course, of Carr’s critique of liberalism in Conditions of Peace (London: Macmillan, 
1942), in some ways a superior book to the more famous Twenty Years’ Crisis. 
6 Murray, Ordeal, 154. 
7 Murray, Ordeal, 16. 
8 Here Murray comes close to what Philip Windsor used to describe as ‘transcending the contingent’. 
See Mats Berdal (ed.), Studies in International Relations: Essays by Philip Windsor (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2002). 
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 Here we see Murray setting out a position that defies the naïve 
utopianism with which he is often associated.  ‘Strife’, he continues, ‘in the 
strict sense of striving or conflict is integral to life. You cannot fully have life 
without it’.9 If peace was taken to mean the absence of effort and striving it 
was not desirable to have it perpetual. ‘Life without strife would be mere 
decay’.10 Certain things were so good and valuable that fighting for them was 
justified, and there were some senses in which the fighting itself might be 
‘good’.  But unlike later Realists who were to erect a pessimistic social 
philosophy around these and other insights into the nature human beings and 
their society, Murray saw them as important but not immutable facts. As ever 
with Murray, ‘civilization’ was the key. As civilization developed the law ‘kill to 
live’ was gradually replaced with the law ‘co-operate to live’. Man was a 
gregarious animal. While it was true that he could not live without killing it was 
also true that he could not live without companionship and love. Here could be 
found the seeds of group co-operation and self-sacrifice for the good of the 
community. Strife and conflict remained ‘a permanent necessity in life’11 but 
as civilization advanced the quality of strife changed. Other tests of strength, 
courage, nerve, endurance, discipline, and honour replaced the resort to 
arms. Peaceful forms of striving replaced violent forms. 
 
 As to the glamour of war, with the arrival of modern, mechanised war 
much of this had dissipated.  Fighting had lost the directness and the call to 
arms the simplicity of earlier eras. War was now so complicated that it could 
no longer without bitter irony be called ‘dulce et decorum’. The moral 
                                                 
9 Murray, Ordeal, 18. 
10 Murray, Ordeal, 33. 
11 Murray, Ordeal, 24. 
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degradation and debasement which accompanied modern war far outweighed 
the traditional martial virtues of discipline, loyalty, and resilience—the 
development of which modern civilian life now provided ample scope. 
Apologists for war confused the human attributes that made it possible with its 
nature. War was not an element in human nature like strife, fear, or ambition. 
War was a form of state action. It was no more an instinct or an element of 
human nature than an income tax or a protective tariff. Those who sought to 
abolish war among civilized peoples were not so naïve as to think that human 
combativeness and other primitive instincts could be abolished. The point of 
civilization was to provide more productive and pacific outlets for them—
especially important in an age when war had ceased to be a safety valve for 
surplus energies and passions and had become an ‘explosion wrecking the 
whole machine’.12 The ‘fundamental condemnation of war …is not its 
expense, not its waste of life, not even its dysgenic influence on the race in 
destroying the fit and preserving the unfit: it is that it is incompatible with 
civilization’.13 And the building of civilization, Murray insisted, was the main 
task of mankind.14
 
 Murray devotes the first chapter of Ordeal to spelling out these ideas, 
which in a sense constitute the social philosophy on which the subsequent 
more practical chapters are built. In these chapters Murray sets out his view of 
where we—meaning ‘the civilized world‘ and especially ‘Anglo-Saxondom’15—
are now and what must be done to create a Cosmos—a rational, ordered, 
                                                 
12 Murray, Ordeal, 36. 
13 Murray, Ordeal, 36. 
14 ‘This service of civilization is our true work; the occupation that gives meaning to life’. Murray, 
Ordeal, 39. 
15 Murray, Ordeal, 163-7. 
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unity—out of the Chaos wrought by the war. The nineteenth century was a 
period of untrammelled scientific, technical, intellectual, moral and social 
progress16, but it grew too confident and forgot to criticise. In particular it 
forgot to criticise the principles guiding its international relations, and it failed 
to spot its ‘one great flaw’: the international anarchy. States remained, as they 
had been in Medieval times, judge and jury in the own cause. They had 
limited means available to them to resolve their disputes. International co-
operation was sporadic and disorganised. International law was weak and 
undeveloped. National armament grew unchecked. There were no collective 
means to identify and punish the law-breaker. Diplomacy was atomistic. There 
was no available method for identifying the common good and little incentive 
to pursue it.17 The wonder was not that such a system broke down but that it 
survived for so long (a matter, incidentally, that Murray failed to examine). 
 
Murray’s solution contains few surprises: the League; collective 
security; disarmament; the development of international law; economic 
sanctions; pacific settlement of international disputes (conciliation, arbitration, 
adjudication); the extension of the mandates system; greater ‘League spirit’. A 
fascinating feature of the book, however, is that it anticipates many of the 
problems these prescriptions were soon to encounter18 yet does not dwell 
                                                 
16 Murray’s evaluation of the nineteenth century was to say the least sanguine. See e.g. Ordeal, 47-8, 
51-2, 137, 162, 170-2, 205-6, 220. 
17 Throughout these chapters Murray relies on a straightforward domestic analogy. The problems with 
this mode of reasoning are legion. See Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order 
Proposals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). The problems with Murray’s thinking are 
the same as can be found in Leonard Woolf. See Peter Wilson, The International Theory of Leonard 
Woolf (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 76-9. 
18 See e.g. pp. 72-3 on the uncertainty of the distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable 
disputes; pp. 80-82 on the fact that ‘law is not always justice’; p. 86 on the paradox of threatening war 
in order to prevent war; pp. 90-1 on the difficulty of expecting states to go to war, as required by 
collective security, when their immediate interests are not threatened; pp. 92-4 on the ‘unequal costs’ 
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upon them. This is partly due to Murray’s faith in reason, science, and the 
collective wisdom of the world’s great experts and ‘savants’ to solve any 
problem put before them (Murray for many years chaired the ICIC).19 Any 
problems not yet resolved in time surely would be. But there is a deeper 
reason for Murray’s failure to dwell and the problems he astutely identified. 
The ‘ordeal’ that concerned him was not only the ordeal he outlined in his 
Preface, but the ordeal of having to come to terms with the devastating blow 
and loss of life of the First World War—the ‘loss of a generation’ that Murray 
himself had helped to nurture (at least its elite element, which in Murray’s 
Olympian mind effectively was this generation). For men of Murray’s 
generation, class, and temperament, the shock of the war was so great that it 
was difficult for them to contemplate that the order in which they had invested 
so much hope was in some fundamental respects flawed. The personal shock 
to Murray and the anguish it caused20 has been well described in various 
biographies.21 It coloured virtually everything he wrote on the subject. In 
Ordeal one gets a vivid sense of what war now meant to the Victorian-minted 
liberal of the early twentieth century. War had become detestable and wicked. 
It made civilised life, and the qualities needed to build and sustain it—
patience, reasonableness, mutual respect, fair play, public spiritedness, 
respect for law and personal liberty—impossible. Another war would spell the 
                                                                                                                                            
problem of sanctions; p. 96 on whether aggressors technically defined are always in the wrong; pp. 
112-13 on the cure of enforcement being potentially worse than the disease; pp. 137-44 (and also 
Wilson, ‘Retrieving Cosmos’, 246-7) on the tendency of states to hedge their bets in treaties. 
19 Fulsomely expressed in Ordeal, ch. 6, and analysed in Peter Wilson, ‘Gilbert Murray and 
International Relations: Hellenism, Liberalism, and International Intellectual Cooperation as a Path to 
Peace’, Review of International Studies (forthcoming, 2010). 
20 One measure of this is that Murray kept photographs of the pupils and younger colleagues who had 
fallen during the war on his study mantelpiece for the rest of his life. 
21 See West, Murray, 159-60; Wilson, Gilbert Murray OM, 244-5; Ann Paludan, ‘Remembering our 
Grandfather’, in Stray, Murray Reassessed, 10. 
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end of the Empire and the benign leadership of Britain.22 ‘We stand to gain 
nothing by war; we stand to lose all’.23 It could also spell the end of Western 
liberal civilization. ‘Who in Europe does not know that one more war in the 
West, and the civilization of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of 
Rome?’24 Tellingly, the volume ends with the words: ‘only by the abolition of 
war can civilization be saved’.25
 
In this outlook on war and what it meant for Britain lies the 
psychological origins of appeasement. The central object of foreign policy 
must be ‘by active foresight to exclude the possibility of war among the great 
civilized Powers’.26 ‘For every civilized nation henceforth the first and most 
vital interest is to be free from the prospect of war, but most of all for the 
British Empire’.27 ‘Our ship has got to be saved; saved with all its faults of 
construction and all its injustices’.28 ‘It is more important to get rid of war than 
rectify than to the treaties’.29 ‘There is no nation more completely innocent 
than Great Britain of any design to plot against its enemies; there is no nation 
to whom continuous peace is so vital a necessity’.30 While Murray opposed 
the actual policy of appeasement pursued by the Chamberlain government 
1936-39,31 these forthright words contain all its essential ingredients—Britain 
                                                 
22 Murray, Ordeal, 27-33, 36-7, 177-81. For an acute analysis of Murray’s attitude to empire (and that 
of fellow liberal and ICIC member, Sir Alfred Zimmern) see Jeannie Morefield, Covenants without 
Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
23 Murray, Ordeal, 234. 
24 Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister, quoted in Murray, Ordeal, 225. 
25 Murray, Ordeal, 236. 
26 Murray, Ordeal, 226. 
27 Murray, Ordeal, 234. 
28 Murray, Ordeal, 210. 
29 Murray, Ordeal, 115. 
30 Murray, Ordeal, 137. 
31 As did many liberal internationalists and League protagonists (see Lucian Ashworth, International 
Relations and the Labour Party: Intellectuals and Policy Making from 1918-1945 (London, I. B. 
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was a satisfied Power, of all the Powers she had the most to lose, peace was 
her supreme interest, peace came before reform, even before justice. In 
Ordeal they are accompanied by liberal enunciation of the efficacy of non-
military sanctions, and a pronounced reluctance (evident in Murray’s writings 
until the late 1930s) to call military sanctions under the League Covenant by 
their real name.32 Perhaps as significantly this outlook on war, which put so 
much emphasis on the maintenance of order, was a manifestation of a 
growing conservatism in Murray’s broader political outlook—in 1950 he voted 
Conservative for the first time, and he was a confidante of the Conservative 
Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, during the Suez Crisis and publically 
supported Britain’s action.33 His liberalism thus became easy prey for radical 
critics who were able to portray it as the self-interested ideology of privileged 
classes and/or privileged nations, its principles and prescriptions no more 
than instruments for the maintenance of privileges in a world no longer 
hospitable to them. 
 
 Hedley Bull once wrote that books such as Murray’s were not worth 
reading now except for the light they throw on the preoccupations and 
presuppositions of their age.34 This view held sway for a generation. The 
writings of the inter-war liberals were of mere historical interest. But a number 
of works in the past ten years have demonstrated that there is more of value 
                                                                                                                                            
Tauris, 2007), ch. 4; and Martin Ceadel, ‘Gilbert Murray and International Politics’, in Stray, Murray 
Reassessed, 234-7), though this does not absolve them, in my view, from the charge of having earlier 
helped to lay its psychological foundations. 
32 See further Wilson, ‘Retrieving Cosmos’, 257; Wilson, International Theory of Leonard Woolf, 68-
73.  
33 Ceadel, ‘Gilbert Murray and International Politics’, 237. 
34 Hedley Bull, ‘The Theory of International Politics, 1919-1969’, in B. Porter (ed.), The Aberystwyth 
Papers (London: Oxford University Press), 34. 
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in these works than Bull assumed—and like Carr he yielded a broad brush 
which tarnished many good works and ideas along with the bad. Examples 
include international administration of war torn and divided territories, the 
commissioning of international panels of experts to investigate social and 
technical matters of global importance, and the prosecution of individuals for 
war crimes by international tribunals—all of which have their roots in the inter-
war period. But a deeper objection can be made. There is a conservative 
premise underlying  Bull’s claim: namely, that there are certain timeless truths 
about international relations that some great minds of the distant past 
understood and developed, but which certain well-intentioned but lesser 
minds of more recent times failed to recognise. It is more probably the case, 
however, that even the greatest thoughts from the past, whatever criteria we 
use to establish them, need modern interpreters. They need an agent in the 
present to keep them alive. But this often involves the highlighting of some 
features and the disregard of others, their recalibration—conscious or not—to 
suit the purposes of the agent, and their re- or de-contextualising to such a 
degree that they are stripped of much of the meaning originally imputed to 
them. It has been argued that Bull indulged in some of these acts in his work 
on the ‘continued importance of Grotius’.35 The point is that it is not the 
voyage of discovery into thought past that is important but the imaginative 
dialogue between thought present and past. Looked at in this way, books like 
Ordeal are important precisely because they throw great light on the 
preoccupations and presuppositions of their age. The theoretical enterprise, in 
IR as much as any field of social enquiry, is one involving observation and the 
                                                 
35 See Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), esp. 34-40, 97-99. 
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formulation and reformulation of hypotheses in the light of experience. But 
conceived as a humanistic as opposed to strictly social-scientific enterprise 
they also involve the acquisition of self-consciousness—the self-
consciousness of the theorist about the nature of his/her enterprise, including 
the often subtle ways that the observer is conditioned by the observed.  We 
can identify and understand the preoccupations and presuppositions of our 
own age—and in the process become more subtle observers—only by 
revisiting and reflecting on works that reveal the preoccupations and 
presuppositions of past ages, especially those of such pitch and moment as 
the inter-war period. 
 
 Different readers will take different things from Ordeal and will reach 
different conclusions about the continued relevance of its claims. But the fact 
that in many important respects it transports us to a different age should not 
bar it from being taken seriously by contemporary IR theorists.  A humanistic, 
and indeed properly hermeneutic, approach to social enquiry requires us to 
read works that do not reflect the assumptions, aspirations, and prejudices of 
our age precisely to heighten our consciousness of those attributes and put 
them into sharper focus.  Such works, especially by scholars of the eminence, 
and erudition of Murray, help to provide us with that invaluable commodity 
‘perspective’ and thus, as Martin Wight was fond of saying, liberate us from 
the zeitgeist.36
                                                 
36 See Hedley Bull, ‘Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations’, in M. Wight, 
International Relations: The Three Traditions, eds. G. Wight and B. Porter (London: Leicester 
University Press, 1991), xx. 
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